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Rules and Institutions in Developing a
Law Market: Views from the
United States and Europe
Erin Ann O'Hara*
Larry E. Ribstein t
Developments in European choice of law seem to offer the United States a tantalizing
opportunity for escape from the chaos of state-by-state choice-of-law rules. Specifically, the
Rome Regulationsprovide the sort of uniform choice-of-lawrules that have eluded the United
States. Also, decisions of the European Court of Justice that permit firms to adopt homecountryrules in some situationsseem to facilitatejuds&ctionalchoice by pivateparties. Tis
top-down orderingofchoice-of-lawnilescontrasts with the seemingly chaotic anddecentalized
system that pievails in the United States. However, decentralizedAmencan-style federalism
might have something to offer Europe because choice oflaw in the UnitedStates has sparkeda
type of law market that helps constamin inefficient state regulatoryefforts. Viewed from the
perspective of whilch system best fosters a market for law, both the United States and Europe
have advantagesthat each could learn from the other
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Several important developments in Europe promise to bring order
and rationality to what traditionally has been the chaos of private
international law. European rules on choice of law for contracts
(referred to here as Rome I) and noncontractual obligations (referred
to here as Rome II) provide general answers for a wide range of
conflict of laws questions. In addition, the European Court of Justice
has been imposing what are in effect constitutional constraints on
private international law under the aegis of the four freedoms of the
Treaty of Rome. Through these rulings, firms and individuals are
protected to some extent from the application of multiple laws where
this could impede trade and travel in the European Community.
Meanwhile, the United States continues to muddle through, as
people and firms face disparate choice-of-law regimes across the states
that force them to be subject to both unsuitable substantive legal rules
and considerable uncertainty about what rules apply to their
transactions in the first place. While federal law theoretically plays a
role through the Due Process' and Full Faith and Credit clauses of the
US. Constitution, these rules impose virtually no limit on state court
choice-of-law decisions.'
Though Europe seems to be moving toward greater predictability
than the United States in choice of law, its lessons for the United States
are not as clear as they might seem. In order to evaluate properly
American and European choice of law, it is necessary to see the rules
through the prism of two choice-of-law revolutions. The first, which
has occurred over the last fifty years, replaced a poorly functioning
rule-based standard for choice of law with a variety of vague, standard-

1.

See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law...

2.
3.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
See infra text accompanying notes 94-104.

HeinOnline -- 82 Tul. L. Rev. 2148 2007-2008

2008]

DEVELOPING A LA WMARKET

2149

based approaches. Defenders of this shift tout its greater realism and
focus on relevant policies.! They weigh these values more heavily than
the greater predictability that the rule-based approach promised but
often failed to deliver.'
The second choice-of-law revolution now appears to be
underway. Fueled by easy, worldwide party and asset mobility, private
parties are increasingly able to choose their own governing laws. The
second revolution replaces state interests with those of individual
parties and firms due to their ability to choose the laws that suit their
needs. Party choice induces nations and states to enforce parties'
contracts to apply a particular law or to have the case adjudicated in a
particular forum, because parties can more readily both avoid
jurisdictions that do not enforce the contracts and center their
operations in jurisdictions that do. Moreover, the rise of international
markets gives firms a strong incentive to seek federal or global
standards when states refuse to enforce contractual choice In short,
states must either get on the jurisdictional-choice bandwagon or lose
their power to regulate altogether. As a result, individual governments'
power to regulate, especially in a protectionist manner, is breaking
down.
This emerging law market produces important global efficiency
advantages. Consider, for example, what happens today when a state
or nation attempts to regulate contract terms in ways that tend to give
advantages to particular local contracting parties. Those burdened by
these protections can, if the costs imposed are large enough, move their
jobs, assets, and transactions to other states. Interest groups that
benefit from businesses locating and conducting business in the
regulating state can lobby the local legislature to either repeal these
laws or enforce choice-of-law provisions that enable firms to choose
the laws of other states. In short, mobility constrains the efficiency
losses associated with bad laws.

See, e.g., EUGENE F SCOLES & PETER RAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 15-41 (2d ed.
4.
1992) (referring to shift in American conflicts law as a revolution); SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES,
THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 9-35 (2006).

Advocates of making choice-of-law decisions that turn on the underlying
5.
substantive policies of the laws at issue include Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing
Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267, 281 (1966); Willis L.M. Reese,
Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV 315, 330 (1972); Joseph William
Singer, Real Conflicts,69 B.U. L. RE. 1, 33-34 (1989).
See SCOLES & HAY, supm note 4, at 15-41; SYMEONIDES, supm note 4, at 9-35.
6.
See SCOLES & HAY, supm note 4, at 652-75.
7.
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To be sure, a law market threatens to impose social costs. When
a state attempts to protect its residents from harmful products or
predatory business practices, for example, easy evasion of these
regulations can prove problematic. Choice-of-law rules need to strike
a balance between enhancing jurisdictions' power to regulate and
promoting the freedom of the law market.
This Article evaluates European and American responses to the
challenge of promoting state interests while accommodating party
choice. Europe's relatively clear and uniform choice-of-law principles
may seem to be an appropriate response to the chaos resulting from the
first choice-of-law revolution. Moreover, the European Court of
Justice's decisions applying the four freedoms under the Treaty of
Rome show some promise in constraining the costs of fragmented
regulation. However, no general rules, including those in Europe, can
fully specify the situations in which states' or nations' mandatory rules
should trump parties' power to specify the applicable law in their
contracts. To make matters worse, European default rules on choice of
law lack any central theory, including one designed to accommodate
the development of a market for law, which may make it harder to
resolve ambiguities in those rules. Thus, despite the European Union's
substantial investment in developing uniform choice-of-law rules,
member nations cannot fully reap the efficiency gains of the law
market.
On the other hand, despite the U.S. failure to squarely address the
challenges of conflicting jurisdictions in a global trade environment,
the United States' dynamic lawmaking institutions, including
significant party mobility among the states and ongoing interaction
between federal and state lawmakers, better prepare it to reap the
benefits of the law market. Thus, even with its chaos, the U.S.
experience offers lessons for Europe.
In general, our analysis contrasts two approaches to conflict of
laws-a European-type system based on centralized substantive rules
that determine the applicable law and an American-type system
offering institutions that facilitate mobility and other pressure on
jurisdictions to recognize party autonomy. Additionally, the
institutional approach is necessarily dynamic in that it focuses on the
process by which choice-of-law rules develop. A rule-based approach,
on the other hand, is more staticin the sense that it focuses on the rules
that either do or hopefully will exist at a given point in time.
Part II below describes the most important objectives of choice of
law in a law market. Part III provides a brief glimpse of American
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conflicts rules, primarily to set up the comparison with the European
approach. Part IV discusses the emerging European rules under Rome
I and II and the European Court of Justice's interpretation of the Treaty
of Rome. Part V revisits European and American law from the
standpoint of the law market. Law markets depend not only on
specific choice-of-law rules, but also on institutions that favor mobility
and jurisdictional choice by individual parties and firms. Europe may
have clearer choice-of-law rules, but the United States ultimately has
an edge in its ability to provide a dynamic framework in which an
effective law market can operate.
II.

THE OBJECTIVES OF CHOICE OF LAW

This Part provides a basis for analyzing choice-of-law rules that
we will use to assess American and European rules in the remainder of
the Article. In general, we proceed from the assumption that choiceof-law systems should resolve conflicts among potentially applicable
laws so as to maximize efficiency. As with other legal problems, the
basic tradeoff in designing choice-of-law rules involves an attempt to
minimize simultaneously defects in political markets on the one hand
and in commercial markets on the other.8 We see two basic
mechanisms for maximizing social welfare-the political process, or
voice, and jurisdictional competition, or exit. Individual interests are
sometimes best served by exit, and other times by voice. Ideally, law
should help produce mechanisms that generate efficient results both by
incentivizing governments to pass efficient laws and by enabling
parties to choose the laws that best serve their often diverse needs.
To see the applicable tradeoffs, imagine two sharply contrasting
systems. In System I there is one jurisdiction, where parties have no
ability to choose the jurisdictional rules that apply to them either by
moving or by contracting. In System I, parties can choose unilaterally
or by contract the laws that will apply to their transactions. In System
I, the regulatory decisions of government are final, and parties have no
way to avoid bad laws other than by lobbying for better ones. Even
In other words, we do not see fundamental differences between the goals of
8.
maximizing individual interests, maximizing state policies, and incentivizing states to pass
efficient laws. See Ralf Michaels, Two Economists, Three Opinions? Economic Models for
PrivateInternationalLaw-Cross-BorderTorts as Example, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 143, 145 (Jiirgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono eds., 2006).
Our use of the concepts of voice and exit are very similar, but not quite identical
9.
to, the concepts famously invoked by Albert 0. Hirschman. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN,
ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:

RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES

(1970).
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with laws that best suit the average company and citizen, those with
differing concerns or needs face individually suboptimal legal rules.
In System II, by contrast, government decisions are irrelevant, and the
parties must hope they are adequately protected by markets. In System
I, voice, or political action, rules; in System II the plenary power to
exit rules. Neither system is desirable. Of course, in reality there are
multiple jurisdictions, each of which asserts some degree of
sovereignty designed to limit some party choices. Thus, designing
choice-of-law rules is a matter of finding the optimal compromise
between these two systems. The following Subparts consider specific
factors that underlie the relevant tradeoffs.
A.

Voice: PoliticalChoice with CostlyExit

Decision rules should minimize the total costs, both
administrative and political, of decision making. Political costs
include the winners' ability to use the governing political system to
impose costs on the losers.'" Interest group dynamics created by the
political system and its surrounding environment are a significant
determinant of political costs." Politicians can be viewed as acting as
brokers among interest groups, where politicians provide these groups
with political favors and the interest groups return those favors with
enhanced reelection prospects, in the form of campaign contributions
and votes.'2
An interest group's influence depends significantly on its ability
to raise money and generate supportive activities. Thus, all else equal,
the group will be more successful if it can overcome free riding by
individual members.'3 If people think they can enjoy the benefits of
others' lobbying efforts, they may choose not to contribute to the
cause." Thus, a group can increase its relative influence by inducing
more beneficiaries to contribute to the common cause." Lawyer
interest groups can be politically powerful because their members'
interests are often fairly homogeneous and their organizing costs are

10.

See JAMES M. BUCHANAN

& GORDON

TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:

LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 23-24 (1962).
11.
See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND

THE THEORY OF GROUPS 111-31 (1965).

12.
44, 362-83
13.
14.
15.

See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice andLegislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339, 341(1988) (discussing the economic theory of legislation).
See OLSON, supm note 11, at 48-57.
Id at 48.
Seeid.at 137-41.
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offset to some extent by the nonpolitical benefits of bar associations."
Lawyers therefore may be able to gain political benefits at the expense
of many other much larger but also much more unwieldy groups of
voters. 7
Traditional public choice theory holds that interest groups may be
weak when they attempt to influence lawmaking in jurisdictions other
than where their members vote.' 8 For example, a state may impose
stringent regulation on behalf of a well-organized local interest group
of small business people such as local professionals or franchisees at
the expense of professionals or franchisors based outside the state.
These out-of-state interests may have the ability to organize nationally
but they may be outgunned in particular states. This "spillover"
problem may affect firms that are trying to sell their products or
services in a national or global market but face regulatory burdens in
individual jurisdictions."
Although interest groups may cause wealth transfers, competition
between interest groups can defeat inefficient laws." If the stakes are
large for both local winners and losers, interest groups will fight hard
on both sides of a proposed law, and lawmakers will likely avoid
making enemies by preserving the status quo. As we will see, this
competitive dynamic is important not only in analyzing voice, but also
in evaluating the political effects of exit.
Even efficiency-minded legislators who try to balance costs and
benefits among all affected groups find it difficult to fashion efficient
laws. After all, they suffer from a lack of information about the costs,
benefits, and effects of the law amid rapidly evolving technology and
markets. Moreover, what little information they do have comes from
the very interest groups whose influence they seek to avoid. The
information deficit is a particular problem for state and local
jurisdictions whose legislatures lack staff and other resources.
However, some states and countries may be willing to invest in a lawmaking infrastructure designed to benefit particular segments of the
economy, and those states can generate laws that are superior to those
of states that lack such incentives.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. The problem is particularly acute at the local government level. See LYNN A.
BAKER & CLAYTON P. GILLETrE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 43 (3d ed. 2004).
19. Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contactual Choice of Law, 37
GA. L. REv. 363, 391-93 (2003).
20. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
PolitcalInfluence,98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 386-88 (1983).
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Exit- JwishctionalChoice

Analysis of jurisdictional choice begins with Charles Tiebout's
model of many local jurisdictions enabling people to "vote with their
feet" for their preferred mix of public goods and taxes." With costless
mobility, people do not need political power in order to obtain the
bundle of government services (and taxes) that they prefer." In turn,
jurisdictions that seek more residents to help pay for public services
have an incentive to minimize taxes and expand public amenities to
attract and retain residents.
The viability and efficiency of this market for public goods
depends on the availability of alternative packages of public goods, on
parties' costs of moving from one jurisdiction to another, and on the
extent to which jurisdictions impose costs outside their borders.23 If
people are bound to a partidular set of laws by the need to stay with a
family or job, the availability of alternative packages does them little
Without enough mobility to fuel a competitive market,
good.
governments may have little incentive to offer efficient packages of
public goods. Moreover, if governments can impose costs on their
neighbors, then their taxes vill not reflect the full cost of their public
goods, and this deficit will lead to a misallocation of resources.
One way to reduce parties' exit costs and thereby enhance the
market for public goods is to, in effect, unbundle laws from the
governments that enact them-that is, to let parties shop for the laws
of jurisdictions outside their places of residence. Of course, allowing
full unilateral choice would eliminate governments' power to regulate
local activities and permit small law-selling jurisdictions to impose
costs on jurisdictions where the law shoppers live or work. Shopping
for law produces the greatest net benefits where the choice is
contracted for jointly by the affected parties, so that external effects are
constrained. In these contexts, choice-of-law clauses can subject even
mandatory laws to Coasean bargaining.
Allowing the parties to shop for law might seem necessary to
subvert laws intended to protect local residents. We acknowledge
some of those costs in Subpart C below. But it is important to keep in
mind that choosing law requires the parties to opt into a set of
government laws rather than letting them evade the law entirely. As
Charles M. Tiebout, A Aim Theory ofLocalExpentwues, 64 J. POL. EcoN. 416,
21.
419-20 (1956).
Seeid at 419-23.
22.
See id.
23.
24. See id at 419.
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long as the parties choose a jurisdiction with a political process in
which various interest groups contend, there is no a priori reason to
conclude that the chosen jurisdiction's law is somehow inferior to the
avoided law, particularly if the parties must accept all of the chosen
jurisdiction's laws rather than cherry-picking the provisions that suit
them.
Just as political decision making may be self-correcting to some
extent because of competition among interest groups, so might
commercial market forces constrain a market for laws. As long as
merchants can gain by choosing lax laws, consumers, groups, or
informational intermediaries have an incentive to learn about these and
avoid contracts that are governed by them. Merchants who trick their
customers or who impose costs on society by contracting for lax laws
might find their reputations suffer when the strategy is discovered.
Finally, voice and exit intersect. When a jurisdiction loses or fails
to attract people and firms because of its laws, those who forgo or lose
business have an incentive to lobby to improve the law. Put differently,
voice and exit are not always and everywhere substitutes. Exit by
some can add voice to others who lose from the exit. These "exitaffected" groups are then added to the mix of proregulatory and
antiregulatory groups competing to enact their preferred laws. In a
world of enhanced mobility, outside interests are often powerful
despite their lack of physical proximity to local lawmakers.
C

Costs ofExit

Allowing parties to exit unfavorable laws sometimes can involve
a "race to the bottom" where jurisdictional competition leads to
socially inefficient laws. This can happen in two general situations.
First, if a regulated party can unilaterally determine the applicable law,
other parties may be denied the protection of efficient regulation. An
obvious example is where a child pornographer selling online could
escape American laws by selling the pornography from an offshore
location, thereby maintaining a market that leaves the rest of American
society, including its children, vulnerable. When parties adversely
affected by a unilateral choice cannot protect themselves, through
market choice, contract, or otherwise, the law market produces
harmful costs. If, however, a party can protect herself from the
harmful consequences of another's unilateral choice of law, then law
markets can produce efficient results. For example, even if a
corporation is incorporated under laws that do not protect creditors, the
firm's voluntary creditors may be able to negotiate with the firm for

HeinOnline -- 82 Tul. L. Rev. 2155 2007-2008

2156

TULANE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 82:2147

protection or higher interest rates. Involuntary creditors are admittedly
less protected, although sometimes they can at least benefit from the
managerial incentives that contracts with voluntary creditors create. In
any event, the law market can potentially impose costs on third parties
who cannot be protected without regulation.
Second, a contracting party may agree to a choice of governing
little leverage or expertise regarding a choice-of-law clause.
with
law
In consumer contracts, for example, the seller's ability to choose the
applicable law arguably stacks the deck against the consumer, because
sellers or producers may have an advantage in researching or
influencing the laws they choose. Some argue that choice-of-law
clauses in consumer contracts are particularly pernicious because
consumers are often unaware of the true implications of these clauses."
On the other hand, firms want to protect their reputations from being
Consumer groups and
perceived as offering one-sided terms.
publications stand ready to publicize incidents of abuse, including use
of a choice-of-law clause to hide contract risks. 6 We do not attempt to
resolve this debate, but rather highlight the opposing sides by way of
considering how choice-of-law rules can take them into account.
D

Achieving an EfficientBalance

The goal of designing efficient choice-of-law rules depends on
facilitating party choice of law while taking care to minimize the costs
of exit discussed in Subpart C-that is, achieving the optimal mix of
exit and voice. We propose a procedural approach to obtaining that
mix. Achieving this balance through procedural mechanisms involves
the following five components.
1.

Enforcing Contractual Choice

Choice-of-law clauses in contracts should have the presumption
of enforceability that is accorded contract provisions generally in a
market economy, even if lawmakers conclude that some regulation of
This is the general principle for
these clauses is appropriate."
William J. Woodward, Jr., ConstrainingOpt-Outs: Shielding Local Law and
25.
Those It Protects from Adhesive Choice of Law Clauses, 40 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 9, 13-14
(2006).
26. Ribstein, supra note 19, at 410.
27. Others have also come to this conclusion. See Larry Kramer, Rethinaing Choice
ofLaw, 90 COLUM. L. REV.277, 329-34 (1990); Michael Whincop & Mary Keyes, Putting
the Private'Back into Private InternationalLaw- Default Rules and the ProperLaw of the
Contract,21 MELB. U. L. RE. 515, 517-18 (1997).
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contractual choice of law in the United States as summarized by
section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 8
2.

Choice-Facilitating Rules

Even outside the context of contracts, choice-of-law rules should
facilitate party choice of governing law. As a positive matter, states
have an incentive to adopt rules facilitating party choice because of
parties' ability to direct their conduct toward jurisdictions that
accommodate choice and away from jurisdictions that do not do so.
From a normative standpoint, the rules should facilitate choice by
enabling parties to know and to choose the applicable law at the time
they plan their conduct and their contracts.
Choice-of-law rules should facilitate mutualrather than unilateral
choice. For example, in products liability and other tort cases arising
out of market transactions, a rule that directs courts to apply the law of
the place where goods are manufactured allows the seller to make a
single informed choice of law by choosing where to locate its plant. If
all companies chose to locate their plants in states with minimal
liability laws, and if one or more states were willing to compete for
these plants by providing little or no consumer tort protections, then
the place of manufacture rule would lead to too little liability. 9 That is
because applying the law of the state of manufacture may not facilitate
choice by the buyer, who would have to learn about the law of all the
jurisdictions where sellers are located.
On the other hand, a place-of-sale rule would enable the seller to
both decide where it wants to sell products and to price products
according to the liability rules imposed on its sales. Each state could
choose the optimal bundle of price and consumer protection. At the
same time, the buyer or plaintiff may be best able to learn about and
act with reference to the law where he buys the product, which
typically will be where he lives or some other jurisdiction he has
deliberately chosen. Even if this is not true for all consumers, at least
some, particularly those buying large volume or large ticket items,
could shop for their preferred bundle of protections. Thus, a place-ofsale rule would be mutually choice-facilitating in this type of case.

28.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
29. For a treatment of the various incentives created in products liability as a result of
the applicable choice-of-law rules, see Michael W. McConnell, A Choice-of-Law Approach
to Products-LiabilityReform, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 90 (Walter Olson ed.,

1988).
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Default Rules

In some cases, where the parties are not acting with reference to
the applicable legal rules, legal rules cannot realistically be said to be
choice-facilitating. In those situations the law could supply a rule that
replicates the result that the parties' contract would produce-that is,
supply a hypothetical bargain as to which law governs the parties'
relationship. This term may be misleading because the intent is not to
imagine what actual parties would do,3" but rather to produce the sort
of efficient results expected in a well-ordered market: selection of the
3
jurisdiction that has the "comparative regulatory advantage;" ' in other
words, the law of the state with the best information and incentives to
act. Like actual bargains, the hypothetical bargain would be subject to
override by mandatory rules based on state policy as discussed in the
next subsection.
4.

Mandatory Override

We not only use an efficiency criterion, but also assume that
markets usually reach efficient results, at least in the absence of a
demonstrated market failure. It follows that a choice-of-law system
should strive to support the market for law and therefore facilitate
mutual party choice in the absence of bargaining defects or harmful
externalities. But while party exit from regulation is an important
antidote to the defects of the political process, there is still an
important role for the political process in making social policy. In
those circumstances, choice-facilitating rules should be subject to
override by the mandatory laws of a state whose constituents suffer the
negative consequences of an unfettered law market.
It is important to emphasize that under our analysis the relevant
choice is not between efficiency and other values, but between
political and contractual mechanisms for achieving efficiency.
Reinforcing regulation of contracts through restrictions on
jurisdictional choice can produce efficient results because of potential
defects in the contracting process. But potential defects in the political
Some have objected to the term hypotheticalbargainon the ground that it does
30.
not adequately assess the parties' intentions. See Jirgen Basedow, Lex Mercatoria and the
Pnvate IntemationalLaw of Contracts in Economic Perspective, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supr note 8, at 57, 65-71.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.18, at 633-34 (7th ed.
31.
2007); Michaels, supra note 8, at 167 (recommending comparative regulatory advantage for
an efficiency-based approach); Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to
Efficiency in Choice ofLaw,67 U. CHi. L. REv. 1151, 1179-80 (2000).
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process can produce inefficient regulation. Accordingly, we turn to a
branch of law and economics, public choice analysis, to promote
political processes that are most likely to produce efficient results.
The problem of permitting mandatory laws to trump choicefacilitating rules is deciding which states can impose overriding
mandatory laws and under what circumstances.
Choice-of-law
regimes generally punt on this critical issue by providing for override
of default choice-of-law rules, including those that effectuate party
choice, when they contravene the vaguely defined important public
policies of vaguely selected interested states or countries.32 Obviously,
a mandatory override must avoid the danger of being so open-ended
that it can undermine the predictability of the choice-of-law system.
Choice-of-law rules therefore need to accommodate political
decision making while preserving to the extent possible the efficiencyenhancing benefits of jurisdictional competition. As discussed below,
we propose a particular mechanism for accomplishing this: the
decision of any state to impose a mandatory override should be made
by its legislature rather than by a court. Under this approach, interest
groups would have to compete directly in order to secure supermandatory rules-that is, rules that trump party choice. The interest
group that prevails on the super-mandatory issue would have to
overcome not only groups that oppose the regulation, but also "exitaffected interest groups," groups that are harmed when firms avoid
contacts with states that will not enforce choice-of-law clauses. The
approach thus helps provide an opportunity for all voices to inform the
debate over whether to circumvent the law market. Relying on explicit
legislative determinations has the additional benefit of providing clear
and predictable rules. Clear rules enable parties to predict which
state's law will apply both at the time they engage in the regulated
conduct and at the time of suit. In addition, rules enable courts in all
jurisdictions to determine readily whether to give laws supermandatory effect.
32. For example, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS provides that the
choice-of-law clause will not be given effect if either
the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and
there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or... application of the
law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which
has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the
particular issue and which,... [according to a separate very vague standard] would
be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the
parties.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2).
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The Federal Backstop

For a choice-of-law approach to work effectively, it is important
to have a federal or equivalent government to intervene in particular
cases where state choice-of-law rules work poorly. This intervention
can occur (1) where competitive pressures force the states to succumb
to a race to the bottom or (2) where state burdens on interstate
commerce are not constrained by the threat of party exit. The federal
backstop can prevent a race to the bottom in situations where the
proregulatory groups are ineffective at the state level but not at the
federal level. As to the second situation, the threat of physical exit may
not be constraining in situations where defendants can be sued in states
with mandatory laws regardless of their lack of business contacts with
the state. Of course, federal government involvement should be used
sparingly because it can have the effect of eliminating the very state
competition that produces the beneficial effects of the law market.
IH. A BRIEF GLIMPSE OF U.S. CONFLICTS LAW
This Part provides a very brief description of American conflicts
law, primarily as a backdrop for the discussion of the European
developments in Part IV
As detailed elsewhere, modem U.S. choice of law essentially
begins with Joseph Beale's "vested rights" theory, which anchors
choice of law in the notion that states should control rights that vested
within their borders.3 This system promised clarity, but actually
delivered confusion, as courts found many ways, such as by
manipulating the characterization of a claim, to escape the constraints
of vested-rights rules.'
The vested-rights approach largely has been replaced in the
United States by a state interest approach to choice of law." In an
influential series of articles in the 1960s, Brainerd Currie sought to
avoid the artificiality of vested-rights analysis by encouraging courts to
explicitly recognize the role of state interests.16 Although Currie
sought to marry state policy with clear rules, his main contribution
ended up being to provide support for courts' tendency to use choice of
law to favor residents, forum law, and plaintiffs. Currie explicitly
33.

See ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (forthcoming

2008); O'Hara & Ribstein, supm note 31, at 1152.
SeeO'Hara & Ribstein, supmnote 31, at 1152.
34.
SeeSYMEON1DES, supr note 4, at 10-29.
35.
These articles are reprinted in BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
36.
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
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assumed that states would want to protect their residents. The forum
bias was inherent in Currie's mechanism for allocating the governing
law, which most frequently resulted in the application of forum law.
And because plaintiffs usually choose the forum, the forum law bias in
turn abetted an increasing judicial preference for protecting plaintiffs.
By the time the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws was
promulgated in 1971, its drafters faced a chaotic legal scene in which
state courts applied a variety of differing approaches to choice-of-law
issues. The American Law Institute attempted to accommodate all of
these systems by combining a set of rules with a multifactor analysis
that simply lists all of the considerations the courts were applying in
deciding on the applicable law.37 The Second Restatement thus left the
courts free to reach just about any result they wanted. However, the
Restatement's compromise did not bring unity, as states have continued
to apply many different approaches. And, as discussed below, the U.S.
Constitution brings only a minimal amount of order to this chaos.38
Interestingly, the most important recent influences on the law
governing private parties in the United States have not been formal
state law or constitutional rules, but the institutions that determine the
These include federal constitutional
dynamics of competition.
protection from government interference with property and other
rights; common language and culture; and firms' ability, enforced by
the Dormant Commerce Clause, to do business throughout the country
without suffering state discrimination in favor of local firms. These
factors provide the basic mobility that enables firms and people to
escape oppressive laws.
Firms' mobility is backed by the availability of the federal
government to alleviate significant pathologies in state competition.
First, as noted above, the federal government can take over a state law
area at the instance of an interest group that claims harm from a race to
the bottom, or where state regulation or litigation unconstitutionally
impedes interstate commerce.39 Second, the federal courts, through
federal diversity jurisdiction, can give interstate firms a refuge from
possibly parochial state courts."° Third, firms have been able to gain
enforcement of contractual choice-of-court and arbitration clauses.
Enforcement of the former has been boosted by United States

§ 187.

37.
38.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

39.
40.

See infra text accompanying notes 102-104.
See O'HARA & RBSTEIN, supra note 33 (manuscript at ch. 3).

See infia Part IV
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Supreme Court decisions," while the latter is enforced pursuant to the
Federal Arbitration Act."
This mobility, in turn, has given them significant leverage to
insist on enforcement of choice-of-law clauses. The current rule,
embodied in section 187 of the Second Restatement, places a heavy
thumb on the scale in favor of enforcement of the parties' contract. 3
The Restatement calls for application of the open-ended default
choice-of-law rule for contract only where the parties have not
contracted for the applicable law, or where the choice-of-law clause is
not enforceable for lack of the requisite connection between the parties
or transaction and the chosen law, or in the face of a contrary
fundamental policy of a state whose law would be chosen under the
default contract rule." Although the Restatement's fundamental policy
exception seems open-ended, in fact, the courts quite generally enforce
contractual choice of law, confining the exception to a few narrow
American courts explicitly recognize
categories of cases. 5
enforcement of contractual choice of law only as to contractual issues
and sometimes refuse to apply the parties' chosen law to disputed tort
issues. 6
Thus, the United States has fostered an active law market, not
because of the choice-of-law rules themselves, but because of the
dynamism inherent in the institutional features of the American federal
system. The loose nature of American choice-of-law rules leaves
much room for improvement, particularly regarding tort law. This
gives American lawyers and lawmakers a strong reason to look to
recent European efforts to harmonize choice of law. However, as
discussed in the next two parts, the United States can draw no more
than limited guidance from these developments.

IV THE NEW EUROPEAN

UNION APPROACH

Europe offers two opportunities for improvement over the current
chaotic American conflicts system. First, Europe has approved
41.
See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-95, 1991 AMC
1697, 1703-04 (1991); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 1972 AMC
1407, 1418 (1972).
42. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
44. Id. §§ 187(2), 188.
45. See Ribstein, supra note 19, at 380-82 (discussing exceptions to the parties'
chosen law in choice-of-law clauses).
46. See id. at 380 (discussing cases refusing to enforce contractual choice-of-law
clauses as to tort claims).
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uniform choice-of-law rules, commonly known as the Rome
Convention, for contractual obligations, 7 and the Rome II Regulation,
for noncontractual obligations." The Rome Convention has been
replaced by a regulation. 9 These rules, which are discussed below in
Subpart A, help ensure that the same choice-of-law rules will be
applied across the European Union, in contrast to the situation in the
United States in which the applicable rule varies from one state court
to another.
Second, as will be discussed in Subpart B, the European Court of
Justice and the European Parliament have recognized a constitutional
principle of mutual recognition that helps ensure international firms
that at least some of their home country regulations will follow their
business activities throughout Europe. This contrasts with the minimal
constitutional protection that interstate firms get from disparate
regulation throughout the United States.
Although these developments create somewhat more order in
European choice of law than exists in the United States, they are not
clearly a better approach to the law market than the apparently chaotic
U.S. system. The European rules lack a sound theoretical framework
that would enable courts to consistently fill in the ambiguities.
Moreover, the European rules necessarily fail to answer definitively
the extent to which mandatory rules trump party choice. Without a
sensible framework that responds to the current emerging revolution in
global choice of law, the rules threaten to impede the law market's
benefits while failing to help protect against its costs. Despite the fact
that the American system for choice of law is far from perfect, in this
regard, the European approach offers little instruction for U.S. reform.
A.

Rome I

The Rome I proposed choice-of-law regulation for contractual
obligations generally provides for enforcement of choice-of-law
clauses,"° with the main exception that the parties' choice is subject to
47. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980 O.J. (L 266)
34 [hereinafter Rome Convention].
48. Council Regulation 864/2007, On the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual
Obligations (Rome II), art. 1, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 43 [hereinafter Rome II Regulation]. The
Convention does not cover marriage and family obligations, wills, promissory notes,
company law, trustees, privacy and defamation. Id.
49. See Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), 2005/0261/COD (Mar. 31, 2008) (adopted
June 6, 2008) [hereinafter Rome I Regulation].
50.
Seeid art. 3.
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"overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the country where the
obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been
performed, in so far as those overriding mandatory provisions render
the performance of the contract unlawful."' This contrasts with the
Rome Convention, which provides more broadly that "effect may be
given to the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which
the situation has a close connection, if and in so far as, under the law of
the latter country, those rules must be applied whatever the law
applicable to the contract" 2 The Convention defines "mandatory
rules" as provisions "which cannot be derogated from by contract." 3
The Rome I Regulation states that "'overriding mandatory provisions'
should be distinguished from the expression "provisions which cannot
be derogated from by agreement" and should be construed more
The use of the word unlawful in the Regulation
restrictively."'
suggests that choice-of-law clauses would be unenforceable only when
contract provisions are prohibited by public law regulations, rather
than, for example, a disparity in bargaining position.
The Rome I Regulation apparently gives much greater scope to
the parties' contract than do the generally applicable choice-of-law
rules for contract in the United States, which are embodied in section
187 of the Second Restatement." This section qualifies enforcement
of contractual choice of law not only where the chosen rule conflicts
with the fundamental policies of a closely related jurisdiction or the
forum, a rule similar to that under the Rome Convention, but also
where there is no reasonable relationship between the parties or
transaction and the chosen jurisdiction, a limitation not found either in
the Rome Convention or the Rome I Regulation. 6
B. Rome II
The Rome 1I Regulation providing choice-of-law rules for tort
cases offers a stronger contrast with American rules than does the
51.
Id art. 9(3).
52.
Rome Convention, supm note 47, art. 7(1).
Id art. 3(3). This provision also requires application of the mandatory rules of
53.
the place where all the elements of the contract are connected.
Rome I Regulation, supra note 49, recital 37. "Provisions which cannot be
54.
derogated from by agreement" is the language used for application of the law "[w]here all
other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located." Id art. 3(3).
See Ribstein, supra note 19, at 373.
55.
For an analysis highlighting similarities between American and European law
56.
under the Rome Convention, see Giesela Rfihl, PartyAutonomy in the PrivateInternational
Law of Contracts: TransatlanticConvergence and Economic Efficiency, in CONFLICTS OF
LAWS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 153, 153-83 (Eckart Gottschalk et al. eds., 2007).
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Rome Convention and Rome I Regulation. 7 The Rome II Regulation
generally eschews American-style interest analysis, which looks to the
content of individual laws, in favor of ostensibly more predictable
jurisdiction-selecting rules like those used in the United States in the
early part of the twentieth century. In general, Rome II applies the law
of the country in which damage occurs, the traditional lex loci delicti
rule, and determines that jurisdiction based on the last event giving rise
to injury.58
Although it provides for a jurisdiction-selecting rule rather than
one based primarily on interest analysis, Rome II, like the Second
Restatement, combines approaches by also looking to the parties'
interests and country's legislative objectives:
A connection with the country where the direct damage occurred (lex
loci damr) strikes a fair balance between the interests of the person
claimed to be liable and the person sustaining the damage, and also
reflects the modem approach to civil liability and the development of
systems of strict liability.59

This "fair balance" may not be obvious in practice. For example, it has
been argued that where the law of the place of conduct contains a high
conduct standard, applying a lower standard embedded in the law of
the place of injury arguably would dilute the deterrence objective of
the jurisdiction where the harmful conduct occurs.6" Put differently, the
justification for the Rome II rule does not acknowledge all potential
interests.
To some extent, however, the rule does facilitate party choice.
Often both victim and tortfeasor know where the place of injury is and
therefore are in a position to plan their activities based on the
applicable rule.6' More importantly, the Regulation aligns with choice
facilitation in the important respect that it includes a specific rule
respecting party autonomy." However, the Regulation makes political
compromises that dilute choice facilitation. The law of the place of
injury does not apply where the parties have a common habitual
residence,63 or where the case is more closely connected to another

57.

See Symeon C. Symeonides, Rome II and Tort Conflicts: A Missed Opportunity,

56 AM. J. COMP. L. 173, 173 (2008).

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Rome I Regulation, supm note 49, art. 4(1).
Id.recital 16.
See Symeonides, supm note 57, at 191-92.
SeeO'Hara& Ribstein, supm note 31, at 1210-19.
Rome II Regulation, supra note 48, art. 4(3).

63.

Id art. 4(2).
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jurisdiction." There are also special rules for products liability65 unfair
competition' and industrial actions. 7 The following analysis focuses
on two categories of exceptions: (1) product liability cases and
(2) choice-of-law clauses.
1.

Products Liability

Article 5 of the Rome II Regulation provides:
1. Without prejudice to Article 4(2), the law applicable to a noncontractual obligation arising out of damage caused by a product
shall be:
(a) the law of the country in which the person sustaining the
damage had his or her habitual residence when the damage
occurred, if the product was marketed in that country; or,
failing that,
(b) the law of the country in which the product was acquired, if
the product was marketed in that country; or, failing that,
(c) the law of the country in which the damage occurred, if the
product was marketed in that country.
However, the law applicable shall be the law of the country in which the
person claimed to be liable is habitually resident if he or she could not
reasonably foresee the marketing of the product, or a product of the
same type, in the country the law of which is applicable under (a), (b) or
(c).
2. Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the
tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with a country
other than that indicated in paragraph 1, the law of that other
country shall apply. A manifestly closer connection with another
country might be based in particular on a pre-existing relationship
between the parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected
with the tort/delict in question.
This rule usually will result in applying the law of the country where
the victim habitually resided. Because it may be difficult for the
manufacturer to determine where a future victim resides, this rule
would seem less suitable from a mutual choice-maximization
standpoint than a place-of-injury, or, better yet, a place-of-sale rule.
However, this problem is significantly mitigated by the qualification
that the law of the state of the victim's residence applies only if the
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id art.4(3).
Id.
art. 5.
Id.
art. 6.
Idart.9.
Id art. 5(1)-(2).
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product was marketed in that country, which ensures that the
manufacturer will have some control over the laws to which it finds
itself subject. If the product was not marketed in any of the three main
designated jurisdictions, the fallback is the place of manufacture under
the proviso, or perhaps the place of contract under subsection 2.
The main question concerning the rule from the perspective of
our choice-facilitation theory relates to the drafters' preference for the
residence of the victim over sale or damage (in both cases subject to
the marketing exception). As indicated in Part I, the place of sale
arguably would be preferable from a choice-maximization standpoint.
First, it is generally less costly for the seller to get information about
how and where the product is sold than about who buys it. Second, the
buyer might prefer the option of shopping in different countries for a
mix of safety and price to being stuck with the rules in her country of
residence. 9 But to the extent that countries impose mandatory safety
rules, they are more likely to be doing so on behalf of their residents
than on behalf of local shoppers where these categories differ. Thus,
party choice ends up giving way to state legislative intent.
2.

Choice-of-Law Clauses

Rome II provides for enforcement of choice-of-law clauses for
noncontractual obligations if the agreement was "entered into after the
event giving rise to the damage occurred" or "where all the parties are
pursuing a commercial activity, . . . by an agreement freely negotiated
before the event giving rise to the damage occurred."7 There are three
qualifications: (1) the choice must be "expressed or demonstrated
with reasonable certainty by the circumstances of the case" and must
"not prejudice the rights of third parties," (2) the court must apply the
law of the country where all relevant elements are located, and
(3) European Community law takes precedence if all relevant elements
are located in one or more member states.7'
Apart from contractual choice of law, Rome II permits escape
from the general rule where the tort has a "manifestly closer
connection" with the law of another country.7 Most interestingly from
the standpoint of our analysis, these provisions specify that "[a]
manifestly closer connection with another country might be based in
69. To be sure, these choices are unlikely to make much practical difference because
consumers typically shop from or near their homes.
70. Rome II Regulation, supm note 48, art. 14(1).
71.
Seeid art. 14.
72. Id.
arts. 4(3), 5(2).
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particular on a pre-existing relationship between the parties, such73 as a
contract, that is closely connected with the tort/delict in question."
Rome II thus makes somewhat clearer than is sometimes the case
in the United States that a choice-of-law clause may cover both
contract and tort claims. This makes sense, because there is nothing
inherent in the tort nature of the claim that necessarily should preclude
private ordering concerning the applicable law. By contrast, section
187 of the Second Restatement states that enforcement applies to the
"law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties,"'74 which can be taken to mean that the choice-of-law clause
cannot work to choose the law to govern a tort claim.
Although some aspects of Rome II happen to align with our
choice-facilitation approach, its overall thrust is not motivated by that
policy. Indeed, it is difficult to find any consistent policy rationale
behind Rome II. Rather, Rome II expresses a penchant for political
compromise in the interest of achieving some sort of harmonization.
But without a coherent policy rationale, the general rules of Rome II
may fail to produce the sensible order that businesses find attractive
when making their locational decisions.
C

ConstitutionalRules: Mutual Recognition

Over the last thirty years, the European Community has
developed rules within the framework of the "four freedoms"-that is,
free movement of goods, of services and establishment, of persons and
citizenship, and of capital-embodied in the Treaty Establishing the
European Community (EC Treaty). 5 These rules comprise a kind of
constitutional restriction on the private international law rules of
European Community member states and by implication on the Rome
Convention and the Rome I Regulation discussed above. In general,
cases decided by the European Court of Justice have established a
principle of mutual recognition that limits the extent to which
European member state laws can be applied to burden commerce
among member states. These cases might, for example, place in doubt
the application of the Rome H place of injury test to the extent that this
73.

Id.

74.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) (1971). In the case law,

this issue generally arises as one of interpretation of contract rather than a general rule of
validity. See Ribstein, supa note 19, at 380 n.56.
75.
See Treaty Establishing the European Community arts. 39-60, Nov. 10, 1997,
1997 O.J. (C 340) 173, 193-99, [hereinafter EC Treaty] (prohibiting restrictions on the basis
of nationality).
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would result in liability for products that complied with manufacturing
and design standards in the home country.
Of particular importance to the issues in this Article are the
provisions on free movement of goods and services and the right of
establishment. With respect to the free movement of goods, the EC
Treaty prohibits not only customs duties and discriminatory taxes, but
also quotas and "measures having equivalent effect."76 Procurerdu Roi
v Benoit and Gustave Dassonville held that an exclusive importer
arrangement that limited imports by other dealers due to the fact that
only that importer could obtain the requisite certificate of authenticity
had the effect of a restriction on trade.77
Following Dassonville,Rewe-Zentmi AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung flir Branntwein extended commercial protection beyond overt
member state discrimination."8 The European Court of Justice held
that Germany could not bar the sale of a French liqueur that did not
meet German standards for minimum alcohol content because the
effect of the German rule would be to impose a second burden on a
product that fully met home country standards. 9 This rule has
potentially very broad implications. In effect, the rule protects sellers
of standardized products who would be subjected to an extra burden
whenever they have to customize products for buyers in different
countries." This could sharply restrict member states' ability to
impose any regulation or liability on sellers that differed from
regulation or liabilities sellers faced in their home countries.
The European Court of Justice retreated from the broadest
implications of Rewe-Zentral AG in Criminal ProceedingsAgainst
BernardKeck and DanielMithouar4 which held that member states
could regulate "selling arrangements" of foreign goods (in this case, a
rule against selling products at a loss), even if goods must then be
modified for sale outside the home state, unless the regulation
discriminates either specifically or in effect against goods from

76.
Id art. 28.
77.
Case 8-74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 854.
78.
Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fir Branntwein,
1979 E.C.R. 649, 665.
79.
Id at 664-65.

80. See, e.g., Horatia Muir Watt, Experiences from Europe Legal Diversity and the
Internal Market, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 429, 447-50 (2004) (noting that the implication of the
court's decision in Rewe-Zentral AG was to ensure that laws of each member state were
harmonized).
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another member state.' In this more recent case, the Court expressed
reluctance to embrace a broad mandate of economic freedom.
The right of establishment is set forth in article 48 of the EC
Treaty, which provides that companies formed in accordance with
member state law shall "be treated in the same way as natural persons
who are nationals of Member States., 83 In 1999, the European Court
of Justice held under this provision in Centros v Erhuers-og
Selskabsstyrelsen that Denmark could not bar a United Kingdom
corporation from opening a "branch" in Denmark merely because the
corporation had never done business in the United Kingdom.' The
Court held'in later cases that Germany could not deny a Dutch
corporation the right to sue,"5 and that the Netherlands could not
impose local regulation on a locally based company that had
incorporated elsewhere solely in order to avoid these regulations."
These cases heralded constitutional protection for American-style
corporate charter competition in Europe.
As to services, article 50(3) of the EC Treaty prohibits
Moreover, article 49 goes
discrimination in favor of nationals.
beyond discrimination and in the direction of the protection of
movement of goods by requiring member states to abolish restrictions
Joined Cases C-267/91 & C-268/91, Keck & Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. 1-6097, 181.
6130 to 32.
Id. at 1-6131. For a discussion of these alternative bases of freedom of trade and
82.
protection of economic liberty, see JUKKA SNELL, GOODS AND SERVICES IN EC LAW: A STUDY
OF THE RELATIONSHw BETWEEN THE FREEDOMS 70-126 (2002).
EC Treaty art. 48.
83.
84. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I1459, 1-1490.
Case C-208/00, Uberseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH
85.
(NCC), 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919, paras. 1-2.
86. Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire
Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. 1-10,155,1-10, 223 to 38.
87. European countries can still inhibit jurisdictional competition if justified "on
grounds of public policy, public security or public health" under article 46 of the Treaty of
Rome. EC Treaty art. 46. Countries can also regulate outside of company law, such as by
imposing legal capital-type regulation under insolvency laws. See John Armour, Who Should
Make CorporateLaw? EC Legislation versus Regulatory Competition, 58 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 369, 401 (2006). They can also inhibit firms' abilities to reincorporate in other
countries, which would be a real constraint on the charter market. For an interpretation of
articles 52 and 58 of the EC Treaty, see Case 81/87, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury (Exparte
Daily Mai), 1988 E.C.R. 5483, 5505-14 (discussing the abolition of restrictions on
movement and residents within the European Community for nationals of member states with
regard to establishment and the provision of services). The Court held that the right of
establishment did not prevent the United Kingdom from blocking transfer of a company's
headquarters to another country to keep the company from avoiding payment of capital gains
tax. Id.
88. EC Treaty art. 50.
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on the freedom to provide services.89 Until such abolition, article 54
requires member states to "apply such restrictions without distinction
on grounds of nationality or residence."9 For example, Belgium could
not require a French licensed service to also hold a Belgian license "'
and Germany could not require a lawyer from another member
country to hire a local attorney to officially handle client matters
within Germany. 2 A similar approach has been embodied in the
Electronic Commerce Directive of 2000, though it accommodates
conflicting public policies. 3
Although these rules have been analogized to U.S. constitutional
protection under the Commerce and Full Faith and Credit Clauses, " in
fact the European cases go beyond any duty the U.S. Constitution
imposes on states to recognize other states' laws. The closest potential
American analogy to the protections in the EC Treaty is under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, which, like the Treaty, requires mutual state
recognition of the law making authority of other states." Justice
Jackson described the clause as protecting against the "disintegrating
influence of provincialism." 6 However, as a practical matter, a state
need have only some principled basis for refusing to follow another
state's law. Although some old Full Faith and Credit Clause cases
involving fraternal benefit organizations hold that the Constitution
compels application of the state in which the organization was
formed, "7 this rule has never been applied beyond this limited context.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
art. 49.
Id.
art. 54.
Joined Cases 110 & 111/78, Ministhre Pub. v. van Wesemael, 1979 E.C.R. 35, 48-

55.
92.
Case 427/85, Comm'n v. Germany, 1988 E.C.R. 1123, 1167-68.
93.
See Ralf Michaels, EU Law as PrivateInternationalLaw? Re-conceptualizing
the Counthy-of-Origin Pnnciple as Vested Rights Theory 7-8 (Duke Law School Legal
Studies Paper No. 122, 2006), availableathttp://ssm.com/abstract-927479.
94.
SeeWatt, supra note 80, at 437.
95.
See U.S. CONsT. art. IV,§ 1.
96. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer Clause of the
Constitution,45 COLUM.L.REv. 1,17 (1945).
97. See, e.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers v.Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 589
(1947) (holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution required that South
Dakota adhere to the contractual obligations of the parties entered into inOhio); Sovereign
Camp of the Woodmen of the World v.Bolin, 305 U.S. 66, 75 (1938) (holding that the
judgment of the Kansas City Court of Appeals had not given full faith and credit to the
judicial proceedings of Nebraska); Modem Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551
(1925) (holding that the law of the state in which a membership society was formed governed
the law of the contract); Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531, 54245 (1915) (holding that courts in New York failed to give full faith and credit to the laws of
Massachusetts when a corporation organized under Massachusetts law had contractual
provisions outlawed by a New York court).
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Allstate Insurance Co. v Hague? indicates the current state of
American law. The Supreme Court let Minnesota apply its law to an
automobile insurance contract issued in Wisconsin to a decedent who
had been a citizen of Wisconsin and had died in an accident there
because the decedent worked in Minnesota, traveled there, did
business there, and his widow became a Minnesota resident before she
filed suit against Allstate." The Court thus indicated that under both
the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses a state could apply
local law as long as it had enough interest that it was not acting
arbitrarily or unfairly." The main constitutional limit on a forum's
power to choose its own law came in PhillipsPetroleum Co. v Shutts,
where the Court held that the Supreme Court of Kansas could not
apply its law to land leases with no connection to Kansas solely in
order to "bootstrap" itself into position to hear a class action involving
the leases."'
Some U.S. Commerce Clause jurisprudence limits a state's ability
to excessively burden interstate commerce and therefore should seem
familiar to Europeans. For example, the Court has struck down state
3
°2
regulation of the length of interstate trains' and trucks,' as well as
truck mudguard regulations that differed from those in place in other
states.' " However, the United States has never come close to favoring
state-of-origin regulation under the Commerce Clause.
In short, by limiting the extent to which European countries can
burden the flow of commerce among the member states, the European
Court of Justice cases discussed above potentially offer much broader
protection from the chaos created by disparate state laws than is
available in the United States. In several respects, however, the
European cases are a dubious basis for rationalizing choice of law.
To begin with, the principle that emerges from these cases is
murky. Because any rule that is imposed on an international good at
the point of sale potentially could impede international trade, it is not
clear when regulation should be allowed in the selling country. The
courts might apply some sort of interest analysis in applying these
rules. But what interests should the court attribute to the home and
98. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
99. Id.at 313-19.
100. Id.at 320.
101. 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985).
102. Id.at 781-82.
103. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981); Raymond
Motor Trans., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447 (1978).
104. SeeBibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959).
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host countries? Should the court assume that home countries are
interested in free trade while host countries want to protect consumers?
If so, then what should we make of a case like Alpine Investments B V
v Minister van Financi'n,where the home country regulated cold-call
securities sales, including those in other countries? 5 The European
Court of Justice held that article 59 of the EC Treaty does not preclude
countries from regulating to "protect investor confidence in national
financial markets." ' But should this not instead be the job of the host
country? °7
Second, Keck's distinction between selling arrangements and
product rules is problematic under the Rewe-ZentralAG dual-burden
approach. Regulation of selling arrangements might have an effect
similar to regulation of production standards in requiring standardized
products to be customized for individual jurisdictions. For example, a
seller may want to build a brand by imposing standard restrictions on
resellers, or to enter into standardized contracts. A significant part of
what makes franchising work is advertising and discipline at the
franchisor level. Conversely, regulating production standards may not
impose a dual burden to the extent that sellers easily can target sales to
particular jurisdictions and design or price their products for those
jurisdictions.
Most importantly from the standpoint of our analysis, the dualburden cases cannot be rationalized under our choice-facilitation
approach. To be sure, the country-of-origin test makes it easy for
manufacturers and sellers to choose the applicable law by deciding
where to locate.'
However, it is important to emphasize that our
approach is based on facilitating the contracting parties' mutualchoice.
Consumers are not clearly in a better position to evaluate the law of the
seller's location than are sellers to choose in which countries to sell.
On the other hand, the application of host country regulation of selling
methods does not necessarily effectuate consumer choice, because it
relegates consumer choice to selecting a country's entire body of
selling-method regulation through physical exit. Perhaps allowing the
seller to choose country of origin regulation will lead to a race to the
105.

Case C-384/93, Alpine Invs. BV v. Minister van Financi n, 1995 E.C.R. 1-1141,

1-1169.

106. Id.atl-1182.
107. For a discussion of the approach to harmonization with respect to member state
regulation, see SNELL, supra note 82, at 127.
108. See, e.g., O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 31, at 1213 (noting that a place-ofmanufacture rule could be favorable for a manufacturer because it would allow them to
choose where to locate).
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bottom because consumers are poorly informed. But it is not clear
why applying the host country rule does not lead to an equally serious
problem of overregulation.
Ralf Michaels draws a dichotomy between place-of-conduct
rules, which he says support markets, and place-of-injury rules, which
he says support state policies."9 However, the rules do not easily
divide along these lines. If Europe's country-of-origin rule does not
facilitate mutual choice of law, then it arguably does not support wellfunctioning markets. A choice-facilitation approach might better
reconcile the member states' competing concerns than does Europe's
unprincipled approach.
It might be said that the country-of-origin approach tracks firms'
abilities to choose the state of incorporation under the internal affairs
doctrine, now constitutionally supported in Europe under the freedom
of establishment. To be sure, the application of free establishment to
incorporation can be reconciled with the contractual approach to the
extent that it effectively embodies the internal affairs doctrine, which
'
we have shown is a rule for enforcing contractual choice of law."
Perhaps consumers can be said to be buying into the goods' country of
origin in the same sense that shareholders are signing onto the country
of establishment or incorporation. But it is not clear that this works as
well for products in consumer markets as for securities traded in
efficient public securities markets.
In general, though the European Court of Justice cases offer the
United States a way out of the murk left by the choice-of-law
revolution, the path is obscure and can easily turn into a maze without
better guidance. To some extent the country-of-origin approach harks
back to vested-rights cases, which offered a clear general rule but that
ignored state regulatory interests without a principled basis for doing
so. Michaels argues that the country-of-origin rule offers the clarity of
vested rights plus the firmer policy foundation of promoting free
trade."' This principle cannot alone support healthy markets, however,
because it has no natural limit: every law that affects goods coming
from elsewhere potentially burdens trade. Michaels would impose a
limit by applying the rule only to protect the formal granting of rights
as by incorporation or license. But if incorporation is enough to
trigger the principle, it is not clear why a choice-of-law clause also
109. See Michaels, supra note 8, at 179-80.
110. See Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O'Hara, Corporationsand the Market forLaw,
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661, 697-98.
111. See Michaels, supranote 8, at 179.
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would not suffice. The internal affairs doctrine is essentially a choiceof-law rule.' 2 There is no reason why the state's perfunctory role in the
incorporation process should make a significant difference in
promoting recognition of a firm's choice of the incorporating state.
This illustrates the need for a better approach to determining when the
country-of-origin rule should apply.
D

Summary

In short, Europe has uniform rules that not only generally codify
choice of law, but offer greater assurance that choice-of-law clauses
will be enforced than the mostly common law U.S. rules. This is
particularly true of contract cases, assuming that courts interpret
"unlawful" in the narrow way the Rome I Regulation evidently
intends."3 However, Rome II makes clear that this broad protection of
choice-of-law clauses is not available to cases placed in the "tort"
category and that no protection applies at all to noncommercial tort
situations. The European Court of Justice cases provide a limited basis
for allowing firms to rely on the permissive rules of their country of
origin, but the principle underlying these cases is unclear, and it does
not seem to be related to party autonomy. Thus, while Europe offers
some protection for the law market, it is not a reliable safe harbor.
V

EUROPEAN AND U.S. LAW MARKET INSTITUTIONS

We have shown that the European Union rules offer somewhat
more clarity than the chaos of U.S. choice-of-law rules. However, the
lack of a principled basis for European rules and the gaps in their
protection of party autonomy raise a doubt as to whether the European
system will produce better results in terms of a more efficient law
market. This Part shows that the important difference between the
United States and Europe regarding choice of law amounts to that
between rules and institutions. American institutions may be better
suited to producing a robust market for law than Europe's general
rules.
More specifically, the institutions of the U.S. and European
federal systems differ in at least three important ways that influence
their accompanying markets for law. First, the cultural, legal, and
language differences are greater among European countries than

112. Ribstein & O'Hara, supm note 110, at 697-98.
113. See supra Part IVA.
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among the states within the United States."' These differences create
greater barriers to mobility in Europe, which results in less powerful
discipline of member nation law making.
Second, the federal government plays different roles in the United
States and Europe. Congress can act fairly quickly and effectively to
respond to protect states from one another and to respond to powerful
interest groups. In contrast, the European Parliament may take years
to adopt a broad directive, and when it acts the directive may have less
direct effect than an American federal law. Also, while the U.S.
Supreme Court has been much less active in promoting jurisdictional
competition than has the European Court of Justice, federal courts in
the United States have played a subtle but important role in facilitating
jurisdictional competition that cannot be replicated in the European
Union. Specifically, the U.S. federal courts provide a venue for
litigation by parties from different states. Because state courts may
display a home bias, the federal courts may prove particularly
hospitable to interstate firms defending against local firms. Indeed, an
extensive survey of cases involving choice-of-law clauses indicates
that federal courts are more likely to enforce party choice of governing
5
law than are the American state courts." Thus, the U.S. federal
government arguably imposes a more effective constraint on U.S. state
legislatures and courts than does the European federal government.
Third, cutting against these advantages of the U.S. federal system,
Europe's institutions are better able to achieve coordination through
private international law rules at the federal level than can the United
States. Congress and the federal judiciary have shown no taste for
enacting choice-of-law rules. By contrast, choice of law in Europe has
6
moved to the top of the legal agenda as a free trade issue." Thus, to
the extent that uniform choice-of-law rules are capable of producing an
efficient system, Europe is better able than the United States to
produce these rules. In an area such as electronic commerce, which is
outside the classic contractual choice-of-law scenarios, Europe has
been able to use its rulemaking advantage as a basis for developing
private international law rules."7 Unfortunately, as discussed above,
Europe has failed to fully capitalize on that international lawmaking
114. See Christian Kirchner et al., RegulatoryCompetitionin EU CorporateLawAlter
Inspire Art: UnbundlingDelaware Productfor Europe,2 EuROPEAN CO. & FIN. L. REv., 1,2
(2005).
115. See Ribstein, supranote 19, at 420; see also O'HARA & RiBSTEIN, supra note 33
(manuscript at ch. 4).
116. See supra Part IV
117. See Michaels, supranote 93, at 7-8.
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advantage because its rules have been motivated partially by political
compromise that dilutes coherent policymaking.
To illustrate the two systems in operation, consider an example of
how enforcement of jurisdictional choice has been established in the
two settings. In the United States, although the internal affairs doctrine
in corporate law has never received Constitutional protection, it
developed early in corporate history because of firms' ability to avoid
states that would not recognize it."8 By contrast, most of Europe clung
to the real seat rule until that rule was effectively upended by European
Court of Justice cases applying the right of establishment in the EC
Treaty."9 Analogously, routine enforcement of contractual choice of
law has developed in the United States as a result of court decisions
and individual state statutes, 2 while in Europe routine enforcement
was imposed by the Rome Convention.' Other types ofjuris-dictional
competition have developed in the United States as an accidental or
intentional byproduct of specific federal laws. 2 Thus, party choice
has developed and strengthened in both the United States and Europe,
but by different routes: dynamic competition in the United States and
top-down constitutional rule in Europe.
Both the European and U.S. approaches have their advantages
and drawbacks. Top-down lawmaking can be quicker, but as we have
seen in our analysis of Rome II, may be more likely to reach wrong
results. The dynamic forces of jurisdictional competition may take
some time, but the presence of a framework in which all of the relevant
interests can be heard makes it more likely that the evolution will
produce efficient results.
Because the American and European systems each have desirable
features, perhaps the best outcome is for them to converge. The
United States might adopt some variation on the coordination
mechanisms that are starting to take hold in Europe-Rome I and
Rome II and constitutional rules preventing individual states from
imposing excessive regulatory burdens. Then, perhaps, state courts in

118. See Ribstein & O'Hara,supma note 110, at 677-78.
at 706-07.
119. Id.
120. See O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 33 (manuscript at chs. 3-4); Ribstein, supa
note 19, at 371-85.
121. Rome Convention, supranote 47, art. 3(1).
122. See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, JurisdictionalCompetition
for Trust Funds: An Empincal Analysis of Perpetuitiesand Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 359
(2005) (noting that changes in the federal tax code spurred competition between states for
trusts).
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California or Illinois would not be able to regulate national firms
through litigation.
At the same time, Europe might borrow from the United States
and become a more open and dynamic system in which firms can
avoid oppressive laws and in which jurisdictions like Delaware and
South Dakota can essentially sell their laws in a national market. One
possible way to achieve that result could be through widespread
adoption of the Hague Convention on Enforcement of Judgments.' 23 If
parties can effectively choose their law by choosing where to litigate,
then the Convention could help to introduce an American-style law
market in Europe.
Indeed, it may be that Europe already is experiencing a version of
an American-style law market. As discussed above, there has been a
distinct evolution from the Rome Convention to the Rome I
Regulation regarding enforcement of party autonomy.'21
This
movement was evident very recently in a shift from the June 2007
draft to the December 2007 draft, which adopted the current restrictive
language on application of connected countries' mandatory rules. It is
possible that these moves reflect the recognition of key interest groups
in Europe that mobile parties will avoid nonenforcing countries or use
arbitration or other mechanisms to control their governing laws. If so,
European countries had little to lose by officially embracing party
autonomy in contract cases. Thus, party mobility may already be
having a political effect in Europe.
Although Europe can emulate some aspects of the United States
system, it would do well to capitalize on its advantages as well. The
European Union can use its greater capacity for top-down rule making
to do what the United States has not shown a willingness to do-adopt
a federal choice-of-law statute. In particular, the European Parliament
might adopt a federal choice-of-law statute like the one we have
elsewhere proposed for the United States.'
Our proposed statute
theoretically could constrain states from inefficiently prohibiting
enforcement of choice-of-law clauses by requiring prohibitions to be
embodied in state statutes rather than imposed ad hoc by courts. This
would force interest groups to incur costs to enact super-mandatory
rules, thereby providing a measure of public support for such rules.
Analogously, European Union member states might be required to
123. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, art. 4, Feb. 1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249.
124. See supra Part IV
125. See O'HARA & RmsTEIN, supm note 33 (manuscript at ch. 10).
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designate their statutes as super-mandatory in order to be entitled to
have their restrictions upheld by the European Court of Justice. Once
designated as super-mandatory, however, those laws should be entitled
to respect in all the other member states.
Such a rule arguably would be only a short step from the current
provisions of the Rome I Regulation, which gives super-mandatory
effect only to a limited category of laws. The difference is that instead
of leaving it up to the European Court of Justice to define unlawful on
a case-by-case basis, creating uncertainties about the limits of this
category, individual countries could clearly identify these rules at the
time they enact the relevant statute.
It is far from clear, however, whether these reforms would
promote a law market in Europe. Because of the basic institutional
differences between Europe and the United States discussed above,
firms and individuals inherently have less mobility in Europe than they
do in the United States. Europeans therefore are less able to use exit or
the threat of exit to effectively oppose individual nations' supermandatory rules. Because mobility is so crucial to the operation of the
law market, it is not clear how much difference these fixes would make
in a system where mobility is more costly. On the other hand, higher
mobility costs are likely to have greater effects on some industries than
on others. Language and custom barriers do not always prevent a
market for law in, for example, shipping regulations, just as they have
not prevented a rapid expansion of outsourcing.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The goal of a choice-of-law system should be to maximize
efficiency by both effectuating political sovereignty and enabling
jurisdictional choice. The first choice-of-law revolution recognized
jurisdictions' competing claims in an increasingly mobile world. A
second revolution is underway which is increasingly empowering
individuals and firms to choose the applicable law. Our theory seeks to
accommodate this second revolution with the competing claims of
state sovereignty.
This Article analyzes developments in United States and
European choice of law against this background. The first choice-oflaw revolution has left the United States in chaos by giving state courts
and legislatures wide scope to effectuate parochial interests. In
Europe, meanwhile, uniform and federal choice-of-law rules are being
developed that seem to impose some order on choice of law. It
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therefore might seem that the United States would have much to learn
from Europe.
On closer examination, the rules in Europe lack a firm
foundation and therefore may not provide much guidance. At the same
time, peeking through the chaotic weeds of the American system is a
kind of disciplined order based on individuals' ability in many
situations to contract for the applicable law, backed by the federal
government's ability to intervene when the states fail to regulate
sensibly. These basic institutional differences between the two regions
may prevent complete convergence.
Nevertheless, we see some potential for converging approaches,
where the United States learns that there are advantages to some
federal lawmaking regarding choice of law, while Europe sees the
advantages of an open, dynamic approach. The two systems ultimately
may find different tradeoffs between voice and exit, but they can learn
from each other in finding the way.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that our analysis is at least as
much positive as it is normative in nature. We have suggested not only
that institutions shouldbe designed to reflect the type of mobility that
provides a basis for the law market but that party mobility in fact
drives a law market even under current rules. Our analysis lends itself
to empirical testing. Specifically, do the choice-of-law rules that we
actually observe arise from party mobility in Europe, or are they
simply the results of conventional political lobbying? From this
perspective, Europe offers an opportunity for comparative institutional
analysis that could deepen our understanding of how the law market
works.
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